Abstract-This brief deals with the problem of mathematically formalizing hardware circuits' vulnerability to side-channel attacks. We investigate whether spectral analysis is a useful analytical tool for this purpose by building a mathematically sound theory of the vulnerability phenomenon. This research was originally motivated by the need for deeper, more formal knowledge around vulnerable nonlinear circuits. However, while building this new theoretical framework, we discovered that it can consistently integrate known results about linear ones as well. Eventually, we found it adequate to formally model sidechannel leakage in several significant scenarios. In particular, we have been able to find the vulnerability perimeter of a known cryptographic primitive (i.e., Keccak [1] ) and thus tackle the analysis of vulnerability when signal glitches are present. We believe the conceptual framework we propose will be useful for researchers and practitioners in the field of applied cryptography and side-channel attacks.
INTRODUCTION
IN modern days, designing a hardware cryptographic primitive requires a countermeasure against side-channel attacks as well [2] . Nevertheless, a complete theory for reasoning formally about countermeasures continues to slip through the efforts of the cryptographic research community.
In this brief, we present a mathematical formalization for reasoning symbolically about such countermeasures. The main result of this work is the discovery of important mathematical rules that connect a successful correlation power attack to the Fourier expansion of the leakage under scrutiny. Originally, we started this research effort to extend some recent results [3] to cover a broader range of countermeasures (such as Boolean masking and threshold implementations). Eventually, however, we discovered an elegant yet effective way to analyze any countermeasure from the vulnerability standpoint. We admit that this is a significant claim that we hope to substantiate in the following pages. To frame this work in the current research context, we note that today there are mainly two "schools of thought" that address the same problem. On one side, some approaches try to decide whether a circuit is vulnerable through formal or statictype checking [4] , [5] , [6] . On the other side, a designer rushing to release its primitive to production (s)he is more prone to detect circuit's vulnerability through a simulation-based approach [7] . We believe these methods are very important during the mid to final stages of the design to verify the original protection claims. However, when we need to set those claims, we are at a loss in terms of mathematical tools to find them precisely. Eventually, we typically resort to more pragmatic approaches that, although increasing our confidence, might yield non-negligible overhead.
To address this issue, we start from classic results in the context of the analysis of correlation-immune Boolean functions [8] , [9] (Section 2) and introduce a few novel theorems that precisely govern the correlation immunity when Boolean functions and leakages are manipulated through classic functional algebra (Section 3). We then show how to apply the introduced conceptual tools to confirm the protection claims of a well-known threshold implementation of Keccak (see Section 4) . Eventually, we show how we can discover vulnerability even when glitches are present (Section 5) and we close with what we think are the current limitations and future developments (Section 6).
NOTATION AND SUPPORTING THEOREMS
In this section we introduce some basic facts about the Fourier expansion of Boolean and pseudo-Boolean functions. gÁx is called Fourier character or parity function and forms an orthonormal basis for the vector space for all functions f : F n 2 ! R [10] . The spectral coordinate g 2 F n 2 identifies a subset of the original n variables whilefðgÞ represents, informally, the contribution of the xor of that subset on the overall function value.
Note that if fðxÞ ¼ ðÀ1Þ
, a single output Boolean function), the above expression is conventionally called the Walsh transform of F ðxÞ (indicated with W½F; g;). Dually, f can be reconstructed fromf with the inverse Fourier expansion Its Walsh transform can be computed as
x 0 x 1 ðÀ1Þ
Now, to compute the contribution on f of a specific subset S fx 0 ; x 1 g, it suffices to evaluate W½F; g; for g ¼ ½g 0 ; g 1 , where g i ¼ 1 if x i 2 S. For example, to compute the contribution of fx 0 ; x 1 g on f, we evaluate W½F; ½1; 1; ¼ 2 À2 ð1 À 1 À 1À 1Þ ¼ À1=2. We can exploit this representation to derive other quantities associated with the degree of dependence of the function on a specific variable, as the following definition shows.
Definition 2 (Covariance and correlation of pseudo-Boolean functions (see [10] )). The covariance between g : F 
Considering that for any character x g i it holds that s x g i ¼ 1, then it follows that the expected correlation is
The classic definition of correlation immunity builds above Eq. (3), i.e., a function g is mth order correlation-immune if and only ifĝðg i Þ ¼ 0 for all g i 2 F n 2 such that 1 w H ðg i Þ m where w H is the number of bits of g i that are 1 (see [8] , [9] , [11] ). However, this is too general for our purpose, as we care only about those variables that are sensitive. 2 Besides, we note that the concept of "order" that is conventionally used in countermeasure theory is different from the one used for correlation immunity. If not stated explicitly, when we refer to the protection order, we adhere to the conventional meaning used for countermeasures which is the order of the statistical moments used to mount the attack [12] . To be more precise, we will use this definition of vulnerability:
Definition 3 (mth order vulnerability). Given a spectral coordinate g s that characterizes only sensitive variables, we say that g : F n 2 ! R is vulnerable at the mth order in g s if and only if F ½g m ðg s Þ 6 ¼ 0.
Theorem 1 (Spectrum of the Hamming weight). The Fourier expansionĤ n of the Hamming weight function H n :
where d is the Kronecker delta function. The spectrum is thus 0-concentrated [10] on degree up to 1 because for all degrees jgj > 1 it holds thatĤ n ðgÞ ¼ 0.
Proof. First, we observe that, given a Boolean variable x i , we can use the expression ð1 À ðÀ1Þ x i Þ=2 to compute its Hamming weight H 1 ðx i Þ. The following derivation is thus possiblê
t u Remark 1. The above result can be extended easily to include the case H a n ðxÞ ¼ P n i¼1 a i H 1 ðx i Þ (i.e., each bit has a different weight a i ), however, for clarity of exposition, we will concentrate on the former. The extension of the results of this paper to the latter case is mechanical work.
A THEORY OF HIGHER ORDER VULNERABILITY
In this section, we set up a few novel mathematical tools which deal with how basic operations of the algebra of (pseudo-)Boolean functions act on the Fourier spectrum, i.e., composition and multiplication. The composition operation is useful to model the power consumption of a digital circuit computing a Boolean function f whose power model is expressed by a pseudo-Boolean function g: Theorem 2 (Spectrum of the composition of a pseudoBoolean function and a Boolean function). Given a function
, the Fourier expansion of h is related to g and f by the following:
with
where hÁ; Ái is the inner product of functions.
Proof.ĥ
From the previous theorem, we can derive two important corollaries. where K is a F m 2 Â F n 2 matrix. Then we have that
where d i;j is the Kronecker delta. It follows that for a function h ¼ g f, the spectrum of h is related to the spectrum of g through the following relation
Proof. See supplemental material, which can be found on the Com- 3. We use the operator À> to indicate the inverse of the transpose of the considered matrix.
Proof. In this case, there is a bijective mapping between g and g 0 so Eq. (6) becomes
Consequently, Eq. (7) can be rewritten asĥðgÞ ¼ĝðM À> gÞ. t u Example 2 (Countermeasure against first order attacks). We now present a small example to show the usefulness of Corollary 2. Assume the following leakage (corresponding to the circuit shown in Fig. 1 ):
where S is a sensitive variable, T is a random mask and d $ N ð0; sÞ random noise. We can derive the correlation with S following Eq. (3) Another way to check for zero correlation is to expand the Hamming weight through Eqs. (4) into (9)
Given that E½ðÀ1Þ T ¼ 0 for a random mask T , it follows that, for a deterministic value S ¼ s, the expected value of LðxÞ is 1.
We turn now to the case where we could have multiple leakage points in our circuit. The following theorem allows us to compute the spectrum of a combining function which is the product of two (or more) leakages:
Theorem 3 (Spectrum of the product of two functions). Given two functions f : F n 2 ! R, g : F n 2 ! R, the Fourier expansion of their product is proportional to the convolution of their transforms
Proof. 
Considering a single leakage f, one could easily extend the above condition to the pth power of f, which is thus vulnerable when the following holds
This observation leads us to the following theorem which, rather unsurprisingly, subsumes the XOR-condition introduced in [3] where M describes the matrix associated with the visible variables.
Theorem 4 (Vulnerability conditions for a leakage that is the
Hamming weight of a linear combination of variables). The leakage L ¼ HðMxÞ þ d, where M is an n Â n invertible transform, is vulnerable at the pth order if and only if there exists a set G satisfying
where g s is the coordinate in the Fourier spectrum corresponding to the sensitive variable.
Proof. By Definition 3, we know that the following must hold
Assuming that there are solutions to the condition expressed below the sum, we must ensure that all the factors of the product are different from 0 and that products do not cancel in the sum. SinceĤ n is 0-concentrated on degree up to 1 (see Eq. (4) does not have solutions; for such a p, it holds 4 that jg i j ¼ 1; 8g i . It follows that, if there exists a minimum vulnerability order, it is such that
as the last condition in Eq. (10) implies. In the following part of the paper, we will always deal, unless stated otherwise, with the minimum vulnerability order of a countermeasure.
Example 3. Let us consider again Example 2; The above Eq. (11) mandates that if there is any vulnerability, the minimum vulnerability order p is such that
Indeed, the equation
has the following solutions for p ¼ 2:
so we say that L is vulnerable at the second order. To verify this finding, we expand the Hamming weight in the expression of L through Eq. (4)
One could thus readily see that there is a term
that is directly correlated with the sensitive variable. By solving for ðÀ1Þ S and averaging over T , one could directly derive an unbiased estimator for ðÀ1Þ
Non-Uniformity of Distributions of Masks/Shares
Interestingly enough, the applicability of Theorem 3 extends to the problem of the non-uniformity of random distributions of shares.
As noted by previous authors [13] , [14] , [15] , it is an issue that might increase the vulnerability of an implementation. Let us reconsider Example 2 where T now is a random variable in F 1 2 with the following non-uniform probability mass function (PMF)
The joint probability distribution of x ¼ ðS; T Þ is thus
where S is the deterministic but unknown sensitive value. Not surprisingly, p x is a pseudo-Boolean function as well, thus we can compute the average of the leakage as E
following some basic fact of the theory of Boolean functions [10] . This observation is fundamental, because the pseudo-Boolean function p x arising from the non-uniformity of T becomes, in fact, an additional leakage. More importantly, averaging LðxÞ in the non-uniform scenario is similar to a bi-variate attack on the uniform scenario. In fact, we can rewrite the above expression into
LðxÞ;
where one can observe that the leakage LðxÞ is multiplied by a quantity proportional to HðT Þ. If we compute the spectral expansion of this product (in the spirit of Remark 2) we can find that it is correlated with the sensitive variable, thus vulnerable, only when p 1 6 ¼ 1=2.
Extension to Non-Invertible Transforms
In this section, we extend Theorem 4 to consider p different leakages of the form L i ¼ H Q i (where Q i is not necessarily invertible) as the following corollary shows: (where Q i is a linear non-invertible transform) is said p-vulnerable in g s if there exists a set G:
Proof. The proof of the above statement is implied by the conditions under which the following Fourier expansion of the product is different from zero
Extension to Single Output Non-Linear Functions
Building up from the previous theorems, in this section we show how to detect the vulnerability for a general class of non-linear functions which, we believe, covers important practical cases. In fact, we consider the following function composition
where f : F n 2 ! F 1 2 and g : F 1 2 ! R. We will show that even this seemingly simple case can be used effectively to model multivariate vulnerability. 4 . In fact a p-order solution G with a jg i j ¼ 0 does not actually increase the vulnerability order as the remaining g i constitute a solution for order p À 1.
5.
We use the Kronecker delta to represent the probability density of each of the elements of the domain of the random variable. 
W½f i ; g ij ; 6 ¼ 0:
A PRACTICAL CASE STUDY: KECCAK
To show a practical application of the previous findings, let us now consider the architecture of a countermeasure devised for the Keccak algorithm as presented by its inventors [1] . We selected Keccak because it is a real-world standard (SHA-3) yet the core mapping is a simple 3-to-1 bit non-linear function of degree two which makes it amenable to the available space of this brief. The considered version offers first order protection against SCA by using a Threshold Implementation (TI) with three shares. The focus point of our analysis is the output of each share; in fact we investigate whether there exists a leakage product configuration that correlates with a sensitive variable. In particular, we are going to consider the following leakages 
where a; b and c are understood as variables in F 3 2 . We also note that each x 3 can be rewritten vectorially as
thus, defining an F 
where R Ã is a F 5Â9 2 matrix that selects the right bits for each leakage. While the latter equation is similar to the one considered in Corollary 3, we still need to express the shares in terms of the original vector x containing the sensitive variables. Here we follow the share composition proposed in [1] , where a and b are uniformly random variables in F 
where Q Ã ¼ R Ã M is thus a leakage specific matrix (see supplemental material, available online for the complete data on R Ã and Q Ã ). Eventually, after deriving the Walsh transform of x 3 , we check whether the condition dictated by Corollary 3 holds for any combination of the three leakages. In theory, we can formulate the corollary as a predicate over ðg s ; pÞ and solve it with an SMT solver (e.g., Z3 [16] ). In practice, however, if one limits itself to three variables and q 4, a full search works as well. Table 1 shows the only vulnerabilities found for q 4 (as the reader can see, no vulnerabilities with less than 3 variables have been found).
GLITCH-INDUCED SIDE-CHANNEL LEAKAGE
In this section, we extend the proposed methods to detect vulnerability when a particular kind of glitch is present, i.e., a glitch due to a non-instantaneous transition of the input signals of the circuit, as the following definition shows:
Definition 5 (Functional glitch).
A functional glitch of a pseudoBoolean function f : F n 2 ! R over a time interval T is an unintended value fðx t Þ; t 2 ð0; TÞ; x 2 F n 2 where x t is different from x 0 and x T (i.e., the intended values of the function at the beginning or the end of the time period).
This definition is useful to model the case where the arrivaltimes of the input signals of the (synchronous) circuit are different, i.e., inputs might settle at different times within the clock period. We also assume that the circuit's output line is driving a high capacitance wire or the input of a register, implying that 
With a small abuse of notation, we use Q i not only to indicate the matrix associated with the linear transformation but also the transformation itself.
8. With respect to the original notation we omit the implicit index i and use just the offset to indicate the actual bit of the share considered (e.g., a iþ1 ! a 1 ).
9. We use an asterisk (*) to mean either a; b or c.
the leakage (power consumption) of intermediate nodes is negligible. 10 In this context, we can model inputs through an input transition vector:
Definition 6 (Input transition vector). An input transition vector
of a Boolean function f : F n 2 ! R over a time interval ½0; T is a vector that combines the function's input value at the beginning of the time interval (i.e., x 0 ) and at the end of the same (x T )
where x 0 ; x T are variables in F n 2 . We also define some projection operators dze ¼ x 0 ; bzc ¼ x T ;
dÁe and bÁc are called, respectively, the upper slice operator and the lower slice operator.
The concrete value of the input of the function at the beginning and end of the interval can always be described using its input transition vector z. For example, the following equivalences hold fðx 0 Þ ¼ fðdzeÞ; fðx T Þ ¼ fðdP T zeÞ;
where P T is a permutation that swaps x 0 ? x T . Assumption 1. We assume here that a 1 bit input signal x can change only once during the time interval T . This allows us to model each intermediate value x t of the input signal at time t as either x 0 or x T . This allows us to represent x t as the concrete value of a specific permutation P t of z
Note that this representation is not suitable when x changes multiple times. For example, if x is meant to be constant across the time interval (x 0 ¼ x T ) but changes at xT Our approach considers a fixed set of permutations. While this might seem as a limitation, we note that there are particular design phases (e.g., after physical layout) were an estimate of the delays (and thus of signal switches) can be done. Otherwise, if the number of signals is reasonably low, one could explore the space of possible permutations to find a vulnerability. and assume that the concrete input signal undergoes the following transitions
It is evident that these signal values can be described just as permutations of the transition vector dze ! dP q ze ! dP s P q ze;
where P s ; P q are, respectively, the permutation matrix exchanging s 0 ! s T and q 0 ! q T . Note that a functional glitch is actually caused by the presence of concrete values (like dP q ze) which do not correspond to neither the initial nor the final value of the function's input.
Leakage Modeling Criteria
Previously, we have shown that a functional glitch of a function f at a certain time t can be modeled as fðx t Þ ¼ fðdP t zeÞ:
To check whether such leakage is vulnerable, we characterize the spectrum of the composition of a normal function and an upper slice operator. 
where g 0 is the indicator associated with the subset of variables x 0 .
Proof. See supplemental material, available online.
t u
Assuming that the attacker can probe the leakage function fðx t Þ in each time slot t, she will see samples whose convolution is potentially correlated with a sensitive variable. The case when f is linear can be analyzed through Corollary 2 and Theorem 4. This allows us to introduce the following theorem. where P t is the permutation matrix describing the current state of the variables at time slot t (see Assumption 1). We say that the leakage is minimally vulnerable at the pth power if there exists a set G and a corresponding choice of the time slots t i satisfying
11
There is a striking similarity between Theorem 7 and Theorem 4 which can be justified by the fact that each permutation P t i is a special case of invertible linear transform. In fact, the former can be considered an extension of the latter.
Note that the above theorem allows to detect a possible vulnerability that can be associated with combinations of input signals at the beginning and the end of the considered time period as the following example will show.
Example 5. Let us extend Example 2 to include a second order countermeasure and to show how the glitch model applies to it. In practice, we add a second mask U to protect the sensitive variable S (see Fig. 2 ). For all the input variables we consider a single transition over the time interval ½0; 1 thus the actual input transition vector will be 10 . While we acknowledge that this not the most general model, we also point out that simultaneous arrival-times are very difficult to achieve thus a leakage associated with this phenomenon will always be present.
11. As usual, this holds when H n is a weighted sum as well (see Remark 1).
z ¼ ½s 0 ; t 0 ; u 0 ; s 1 ; t 1 ; u 1 > :
The order of transitions can give rise to different propagation sequences; Table 2 just describes one of them, i.e., the case where S changes at time-slot 1, followed by T and U. If we want, for example, to detect vulnerabilities at the second order in the first two time slots, we check whether the combinatorial problem in Eq. (25) has any solution ðG; g s Þ with the following data: where M and P t are known from Table 2 and Fig. 2 . The solution(s) might be multiple; among the interesting ones we find with brute force there is
where g s corresponds to the spectral coordinate of s 0 þ s 1 which is thus vulnerable. It can be shown (see supplemental material, available online) that the average leakage conditioned to the sensitive variables is
which indeed depends on the transition of the sensitive variable S over the time interval.
Functional Glitches in a Non-Linear Circuit
The above theory of functional glitches can be extended to non-linear circuits such as those considered in Section 3.3. Let us consider a single non-linear function that emits a leakage through H 1 Lðz; tÞ ¼ H 1 ðfðdP t zeÞÞ:
We can check whether this function is vulnerable to functional glitches by checking if there is any set of spectral coordinates
for which the following expansion is different from zero
W½f; dg i e; ½by Theorem 6 We know that the correlation with g s is not zero only if we find a pair of spectral coordinates ðg 1 ; g 2 Þ for which Eq. (28) is satisfied. 13 On the one hand, the subscript of the sum in Eq. (28) requires that any pair should satisfy
which, substituting g s and after some simple algebraic manipulation, can be rewritten as g 1 ¼ g 2^b itðg 1 ; 1Þ:
Both pair components should thus i) be equal and ii) have the second bit set (in the following we will use the symbol g to refer to the same value g 1 ¼ g 2 ). On the other hand, Eq. (28) is satisfied only if dge belongs to the support of W½x 3 Q a ; (see Corollary 3). As can be seen in Table 3 , there are candidates for g belonging to such support (those marked with the asterisk) 12. Each leakage depends on 9 variables, the first 3 of which are the sensitive ones.
13. We look only for two coordinates because we have two time slots, i.e., p ¼ 2.
which make Eq. (28) satisfiable, thus the considered leakage correlates with a transition on the sensitive variable s 1 . Eventually, if we repeat the process for all the three shares, we find the vulnerabilities expressed in Table 4 which are all at the second order (as the smallest p we've found is 2) and concern only L a and L b .
CONCLUSIONS
In this brief, we have proposed a spectral model for reasoning symbolically about a countermeasure against side-channel attacks. The proposed framework allows one to detect, in a mathematically sound way, whether a general class of countermeasures holds up to a specific protection order. The symbolic treatment allowed us to derive precise combination functions useful for attacks, as well as confirm certain claims about a threshold implementation of Keccak. In addition, we have shown that the framework allows one to tackle the problem of glitch-based leakages, and we give some practical applications for this case. Further development of this work might include extending it to a broader set of nonlinear functions and to multiple changes of a signal during a time interval. 
L Ã is the leakage measured at t 0 while L 0 Ã is the one measured at t 1 . Note that the sum of both leakages is just the energy consumed in the whole time interval.
